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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STUART, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN DEERE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
INTRODUCTION 
The statement of the issues, jurisdictional statement, 
statement of the case and statement of the facts are set forth in 
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 1 through 10. Appellant takes 
this opportunity to respond to the argument set forth in 
Respondent's Brief. The remaining arguments are adequately 
covered in Appellants Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Because of the parol evidence rule, in ruling on summary 
judgement the trial court was faced with the threshold 
determination of whether there was a factual issue concerning 
integration and/or ambiguity of the Insurance Contract. This 
determination presented the court with only two acceptable 
courses of action: 
Case No. 900052-CA 
Category No. 14b 
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(1) The court could decide there was no factual issue 
concerning integration or ambiguity of the contract— 
that the contract was integrated and unambiguous as a 
matter of law. This choice would preclude the court 
from considering extrinsic or parol evidence in ruling 
on the motions for summary judgment. 
(2) The court could determine that factual issues 
concerning integration and/or ambiguity had been raised 
by the parties, which would require the taking of 
evidence and the making of factual findings. Upon 
choosing this option, the court could allow the fact 
finder to review parol or extrinsic evidence at trial 
to determine the intent of the parties vis-a-vis the 
insurance contract, but would be precluded from 
granting summary judgment to either party. 
In this case, the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant, after making findings of fact based on parol and 
extrinsic evidence. In doing so, the court violated the parol 
evidence rule and/or usurped the role of the fact finder, and 
thereby committed reversible error. 
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II. 
Plaintiff made a proper and timely objection to parol and 
extrinsic evidence being admitted to the court on the motion for 
summary judgment, 
III. 
In Utah, a certificate of insurance should be treated as 
mere evidence of insurance and not as part of the insurance 
contract. Assuming arguendo that the certificate of insurance is 
part of the insurance contract, judicial policy considerations 
dictate that conflicting language between the certificate of 
insurance and the master insurance policy be interpreted to 
provide the broadest possible coverage to the insured. 
IV. 
No language in the policy provides for automatic termination 
of the policy. Because the policy was not cancelled nor 
terminated prior to April 1, 1988, coverage was in place on the 
date Plaintiff's backhoe was destroyed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND/OR 
USURPED THE ROLE OF THE FACT FINDER, AND 
THEREBY COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A. The court had two options under the parol evidence rule. 
In ruling upon summary judgment in this matter, the trial 
court was required to interpret an insurance contract. 
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Therefore, the court's actions in formulating its ruling on 
summary judgment were required to comply with the parol evidence 
rule. 
The parol evidence rule, which is the general rule employed 
in the construction of insurance contracts, as with all other 
written contracts, states that parol or extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissable to change, alter or vary the express terms of an 
integrated written agreement* Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. 
Zumstein, 675 P. 2d 729, 734 (Ariz. App. 1983). To preserve the 
sanctity of written instruments, the intent of the parties to a 
written integrated contract should be found within the four 
corners of that instrument. See, Stanqer v. Sentinel Sec. Life 
Ins. , 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). "Evidence of oral 
representations is not admissible where a document is clear and 
unambiguous on its face." Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. 
Zumstein, 675 P. 2d at 7 34. Furthermore, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a contract which is clear and unambiguous on its 
face and appears to be an integration is what it appears to be, 
and will be treated as such unless evidence is submitted to prove 
otherwise. See, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663, 665 (Utah 
1985); Accord, E.A. Strout Realty Agency, inc. v. Broderick, 522 
P.2d 144, 145 (Utah 1974). 
Because the parol evidence rule was applicable to the motion 
and cross motion for summary judgment in question, and because 
the parol evidence rule applies only to integrated, unambiguous 
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contracts, in ruling on that motion the trial court was faced 
with the threshold determination of whether there was a factual 
issue concerning integration and/or ambiguity of the insurance 
contract. See, Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 
P.2d 483, 486-487 (Utah 1986); See also. Union Bank v. Swenson, 
707 P.2d at 665; Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983); Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981). This determination presented the court with only 
two acceptable courses of action. 
As one option, the court could decide there was no factual 
issue concerning integration or ambiguity of the contract—that 
the contract was integrated and unambiguous as a matter of law. 
See, Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 283 
(Utah App. 1987); Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). If the court chose this option, it would be limited to 
the interpreting the contract by using the information contained 
within the four corners of the master policy, and would be 
precluded from considering extrinsic or parol evidence in ruling 
on the motion for summary judgment. See, Stanger v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins., 669 P.2d at 1205; Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. 
Zumstein, 675 P.2d at 734. 
As the other option, the court could determine that factual 
issues concerning integration and/or ambiguity had been raised by 
the parties, which would require the taking of evidence and the 
making of factual findings. C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 
5 
P. 2d 923, 929 (Utah App. 1988). Upon choosing this option, the 
court could allow the fact finder to review parol or extrinsic 
evidence at trial to determine the intent of the parties vis-a-
vis the insurance contract. See, C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 
758 P.2d at 929; Ringwood v. Foreign Autoworks, Inc., 671 P.2d 
182, 183 (Utah 1983); Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d at 
1194; Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P. 2d at 1293. However, the 
court would then be precluded from granting summary judgment to 
either party. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 
P.2d at 488 ("Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and 
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for 
summary judgment."); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 6 65 P. 2d at 1293 
("Of course, a motion for summary judgment may not be granted if 
a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the 
contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended.") 
B. Factual issues were presented to the court. 
In this case, the trial judge did not expressly rule whether 
the purported insurance policy was an integrated writing or 
whether the terms of the contract were ambiguous (R.195-197, 204-
206). Nevertheless, the threshold issue of whether there was a 
factual issue concerning integration and/or ambiguity of the 
insurance contract was presented to the court. The defendant 
raised the issue of integration and ambiguity of the contract in 
asserting in its various memoranda in support of its summary 
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judgment motion that the court should consider documents 
extrinsic to the insurance contract (the Installment Contract and 
the Certificate of Insurance) and parol evidence (the Affidavit 
of Deborah Kamenetsky) to show that the parties' intentions were 
contrary to the plain meaning of the language contained in the 
amended insurance contract (R.26-33, 117-125). 
The Plaintiff responded by asserting that the insurance 
contract was unambiguous and clear on its face, and therefore, 
the court should not consider the above mentioned documents 
extrinsic to the insurance contract or the Affidavit of Deborah 
Kamenetsky in ruling on the summary judgment motion. (R.94, 95, 
146, 177, 178; T.5, 9, 10). 
Once the factual issue, of whether a writing before the 
court is an integration adopted by the parties as the complete 
expression of their bargain, is properly presented to the court, 
the court is faced by a question of fact to be resolved by the 
fact finder at trial. See, Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. 
Const., 731 P.2d at 487; Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 
at 1194. Likewise, once the factual issue of whether the 
contract language is ambiguous is properly presented to the 
court, the court is faced with a factual issue to be determined 
by the fact finder at trial. See, C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 
758 P.2d at 929; Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293. 
The factual issue presented to the court relating to 
integration was whether the insurance policy, Policy No. IM-
14319, dated January 1, 1982, as amended, was the entire 
integrated insurance contract, or whether the installment 
contract or certificate of insurance should also be included as 
part of the integrated contract. 
The factual issue before the court relating to ambiguity of 
the contract was created by conflicting meanings of the language 
of paragraph 22 of the insurance contract, entitled "Additional 
Conditions" (R.74), and the small print found at the bottom of 
the endorsement form (R.81). Paragraph 22 of the insurance 
contract, entitled "Additional Conditions," states: "All 
conditions of the printed policy that are at variance or in 
conflict with the terms and provisions of any endorsement 
attached to said printed policy are hereby waived" (R.74). The 
small print at the bottom of the endorsement form states: 
"Nothing herein contained shall be held to vary, waive, alter or 
extend any of the terms conditions, agreements or declarations of 
the policy other than as herein stated" (R.81). 
It is argued by the Plaintiff that the amendment to the 
original paragraph 3 of the insurance contract, contained in the 
endorsement effective September 1, 1983, "varied" from the 
original paragraph 3 of the insurance contract (R.96, T.6). The 
word "vary" is defined as follows: "v.i. 1. to undergo change in 
some way; to become different." Websters New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd Edition, Dorset & Baker, 1983, p. 
2022. Therefore, the Plaintiff argues that under paragraph 22 of 
the insurance contract, as quoted above, the amended paragraph 3 
of the insurance contract should be substituted completely for 
the original paragraph 3 of the insurance contract (R.96, T.6). 
On the other hand, the Defendant in interpreting the small 
print found on the bottom of the endorsement form, as quoted 
above, argues that since the amended paragraph 3 of the insurance 
contract did not expressly state that the omitted language had 
been purposefully stricken, the omitted language was not waived 
by the endorsement to the insurance contract (R.120, 121). 
"A contract is considered ambiguous if 'the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient 
in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings.'" C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 
at 928. Because the two clauses above can give two different 
meanings to the amended paragraph 3 of the insurance contract, an 
ambiguity has been created and summary judgment is not 
appropriate. Id., at 929. 
C. The Kamenetsky Affidavit did not resolve any factual issues. 
Defendant also argues that even if the matter of ambiguity 
of the contract was at issue, the affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky 
was unrebutted, and thus resolved any factual issue about 
ambiguity, allowing the court to rule on the motion for summary 
judgment as a matter of law. It appears that defendant is 
confusing the concepts of "contested facts" and "issues of 
material fact." There are cases where no facts are contested, 
but where genuine issues of material fact still exist, such as is 
the case here. Accord, Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 
(Utah 1978). In spite of the unrebutted affidavit of Deborah 
Kamenetsky, an ambiguity remains as to how the language of 
paragraph 22 of the insurance contract (R.74) should be 
interpreted in light of the small print contained on the bottom 
of the endorsement form (R.81), in determining the effect of the 
endorsement in amending paragraph 3 of the insurance contract. 
Deborah Kamenetsky's affidavit asserts that the Defendant 
made a unilateral mistake in amending paragraph 3 of the 
insurance contract (R.128-137). However, a "unilateral mistake 
is not ordinarily grounds for relief for the mistaken party, 
whereas mutual mistake can be grounds for relief." Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. v. Wood By-Products, 695 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Idaho 
App. 19 84). Because the insurance company's mistake is a 
unilateral one, Deborah Kamenetsky's affidavit does not resolve 
the issue of ambiguity of the contract. Furthermore, as was 
explained above, the very language of the contract refutes the 
Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky and creates a genuine issue of 
material fact relating to ambiguity of the insurance contract, 
even though the facts presented to the court by the parties are 
uncontroverted. 
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The Defendant makes the additional assertion that even if 
the insurance policy languge was ambiguous, because of the 
unrebutted Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky, Defendant's 
interpretation of the ambiguous language should be adopted by the 
court. It has long been the position of the Utah Supreme Court 
that ambiguous contract language should be construed against the 
party who drafted it and favorably toward the other party againt 
whom it is evoked. See, Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North 
America, 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah 1983); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
v. Midwest Realty and Fin., Inc., 544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975). 
Thus, even though it would be improper for the appellate court to 
usurp the role of the fact finder and to make factual findings 
relating to the intent of the parties, if an ambiguity is found 
to exist, and if such findings were to be made, they should favor 
the Plaintiff rather than the Defendant under Utah law. 
D. Parol evidence is not admissible in ruling upon summary 
judgment. 
Defendant asserts in its Respondent's Brief that the case 
of Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P. 2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 1972), 
stands for the legal principle that in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, a court may admit and consider extrinsic 
evidence in order to clarify ambiguities in a contract. (See 
Brief of Respondent pages 24, 25.) In light of the significant 
case law created subsequent to the Wingets case, as set forth 
hereinabove which rebuts this proposition, it is apparent that 
11 
the Defendants interpretation of the Winqets case is erroneous. 
Although a court should look to the whole contract and its 
purpose, admitting parol or extrinsic evidence if necessary to do 
so, it should admit such extrinsic evidence only to the finder of 
fact at trial, rather than considering such factual evidence in 
order to make factual findings in a motion for summary judgment 
setting. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293; See also, 
Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 790 P.2d 1304, 1308 
(Utah 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Hill ex. rel. Foqel v. Grand Cent., 
Inc., 477 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1970). 
On page 30 of the Respondent's Brief, the Defendant also 
states that Plaintiff conceded in the Appellant's Brief that if a 
court decides that a contract is ambiguous, it may go on to 
consider parol evidence in ruling upon summary judgment. 
Defendant misconstrues the Plaintiff's position on this issue. 
Although the Plaintiff concedes that if a court determines a 
contract to be ambiguous, it may admit parol evidence on the 
issue, Plaintiff asserts that it is never proper to admit the 
parol evidence in a motion for summary judgment setting, but is 
only proper to admit such evidence to be considered by the fact 
finder at trial. See, C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P. 2d at 
929. 
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In summary, by granting summary judgment to the Defendant 
after making findings of fact based on parol and extrinsic 
evidence, the court violated the parol evidence rule, and thereby 
committed reversible error. See, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 
1984). In the alternative, because it appears there are genuine 
issues of material fact relating to both the integration of the 
contract and ambiguity of the contract language, a grant of 
summary judgement was improper and the trial court's Order for 
Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice should 
be reversed. 
POINT II: 
PLAINTIFF MADE A PROPER AND TIMELY OBJECTION 
TO THE PAROL AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
TO THE COURT BY THE DEFENDANT. 
In the Respondent's Brief at page 30, the Defendant states 
that "the decisions of this court and the Utah Supreme Court make 
clear that a party's failure to object to or move to strike an 
affidavit constitutes a waiver of formal or evidentiary defects 
in the affidavit." [Emphasis added.] See, Hobelman Motors, Inc. 
v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1984). 
Although the Plaintiff failed to move to strike the 
Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky, the Plaintiff did properly 
object to admission of the Affidavit on the basis that it was 
parol evidence (R.94, 95, 146, 177, 178; T.5, 9, 10). Since the 
Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky was admissible in every other 
respect, the proper objection in this case was not a Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit, but rather, the very objection made by the 
Plaintiff, namely, the objection that the admission of the 
Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky was in violation of the parol 
evidence rule. See, Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah 
1969). Therefore, the Defendant's argument that it was not error 
for the trial court to consider the Kamenetsky Affidavit, because 
Plaintiff never moved to strike it prior to or at the hearing, is 
erroneous. 
POINT III: 
ALTHOUGH THE CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE SHOULD 
BE TREATED AS MERE EVIDENCE OF INSURANCE, 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COURT FINDS 
OTHERWISE, CONFLICTING LANGUAGE BETWEEN THE 
CERTIFICATE AND THE MASTER POLICY SHOULD BE 
INTERPRETED TO PROVIDE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE 
COVERAGE TO THE INSURED. 
Defendant cites Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 757 
P.2d, 1374 (Wash. 1988), as standing for the legal principle that 
a certificate of insurance should be read to be part of the 
master policy. However, the Washington Court's ruling was 
premised on the fact that Washington law requires the issuance of 
certificates of insurance. See, Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. 
Co. , 757 P.2d at 1376. The Utah Code Annotated does not contain 
a similar provision requiring certificates of insurance. 
However, U.C.A. Section 31A-1-301(13) defines a certificate as 
follows: "'Certificate' means the evidence of insurance given 
to an insured under a group policy." It appears from this 
definition that a certificate of insurance is considered to be 
only mere evidence of insurance in the State of Utah, and does 
not comprise part of the insurance contract. The Fittro case 
recognized that some courts have ruled that a certificate of 
insurance is not part of the insurance contract. Those courts 
based that ruling on reasoning that the certificate of insurance 
is mere evidence of insurance. Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. 
Co., 757 P.2d at 1377. Since Utah is a state where there are no 
statutory requirements for issuance of certificates of insurance, 
and the only reference in the statutory language to certificates 
of insurance treats a certificate as merely evidence of 
insurance, this court should find that the certificate of 
insurance was not part of the integrated insurance contract. In 
addition, the certificate of insurance states on its face that it 
is "not a contract of Insurance." (R.9). Defendant has not set 
forth any valid arguments in its brief that overcome his express 
disclaimer on the face of the certificate of insurance. 
Nevertheless, even if the court were to find that the 
certificate of insurance is part of the insurance contract, the 
court should interpret any conflicting language in the 
certificate of insurance and the master policy "to provide the 
broadest coverage" to insured. See, Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life 
Ins. Co. , 757 P. 2d at 1377. In addition, any ambiguities or 
conflicts between the language of the certificate of insurance 
and the master policy should be resolved against the insurance 
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company and in favor of the insured. See, Martin v. Crown Life 
Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 1099, 1102-1103 (Mont. 1983). The Defendant 
misconstrues the Fittro and the Martin cases, supra, in stating 
that "the coverage provisions stated in a certificate of coverage 
furnished to the insured by the insurer takes precedence over 
conflicting terms in the master policy." (Respondent's Brief at 
page 27, referring to Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 757 
P.2d at 1376). This is the case only when the insured has relied 
on the certificate of insurance, rather than the master policy, 
and when the certificate of insurance provides broader, more 
favorable coverage to the insured than does the master policy. 
See, Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d at 1376-1377; 
Martin v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 658 P.2d at 1102-1103. 
In this case, if anything, the Plaintiff relied on the 
disclaimer language contained within the language of the 
certificate of insurance, stating that the "certificate is not a 
contract of Insurance...," to mean that Plaintiff was not bound 
by the terms contained in the certificate of insurance. 
Defendants cannot logically argue that the parties are bound by 
the terms of the certificate of the insurance, but not by the 
disclaimer language, which is one of the terms of the certificate 
of insurance. Under Martin, supra, any conflicts should be 
resolved in favor of the insured, not the insurer, contrary to 
what Defendant has erroneously argued to the Court. See, Martin 
v. Crown Life Ins Co., 658 P.2d at 1102-1103. 
It should be pointed out that Plaintiff did rely on the 
Acceptance/Confirmation form (which also contained the 
certificate of insurance) (R.9) to the extent that it contained 
the effective date and expiration date of the insurance coverage, 
namely, December 20, 1983, zo April 1, 1988, but only to that 
extent. 
Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff never saw 
the master policy until after his loss, Plaintiff cannot take 
advantage of favorable terms contained in the policy. The Fittro 
and Martin cases, supra, also rebut this allegation. Accord, 
Fittro v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d at 1376-1377; 
Martin v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 658 P.2d at 1102-1103. 
POINT IV: 
BECAUSE THE POLICY WAS NOT AUTOMATICALLY 
TERMINATED, NOR CANCELLED, PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 
19 88, COVERAGE WAS IN PLACE ON THE DATE 
PLAINTIFF'S BACKHOE WAS DESTROYED. 
In reviewing the trial court's interpretation of the subject 
contract, if the contract is integrated, and clear and ambiguous 
on its face, so that interpretation of the contract is a question 
of law, upon review, the appellate court should accord the trial 
court's construction no particular weight and should review the 
trial court's decision under the correctness standard. Craig 
Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihinq, 747 P.2d at 283; Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P. 2d at 716. The Plaintiff has at all times 
contended, and continues to contend, that the insurance contract 
is integrated, and clear and unambiguous on its face, and that 
~\ n 
the appellate court should, therefore, review the trial courts 
decision based a correctness standard (R.146, 177, 178). 
Additionally, because the Installment Contract, Certificate of 
Insurance and Affidavit of Deborah Kamenetsky are extrinsic or 
parol evidence, the appellate court should disregard such 
evidence in formulating its interpretation and construction of 
the subject insurance contract. See, Farmers Ins. Co* of Arizona 
v. Zumstein, 675 P.2d at 734; Stanqer v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. 
Co. , 66 9 P. 2d at 1205. Finally, the Affidavit of Deborah 
Kamenetsky should be ignored on the additional basis that it sets 
forth a unilateral mistake on the part of the Defendant, which 
is not grounds for relief on a contract. See, Mutual of Enumclaw 
Ins. v. Wood By-Products, 695 P.2d at 411-412. 
The original paragraph 3 of the insurance policy entitled 
"Attachment of Insurance" stated in part: 
"This insurance terminates when the actual 
maturity date of the note is reached or the 
date on which the security interest of John 
Deere in said equipment terminates, whichever 
first occurs." (R.68). 
However, paragraph 3 of the insurance contract was amended by an 
Endorsement provision effective September 1, 1983 (R.81). The 
Endorsement omitted the sentence quoted immediately above, 
thereby eliminating this automatic termination provision (R.68, 
81). Paragraph 22 of the insurance contract, entitled 
"Additional Conditions," states: "All conditions of the printed 
policy that are at variance or in conflict with the terms and 
provisions of any endorsement attached to said printed policy are 
hereby waived" (R.74). Since the amendment to the original 
paragraph 3 of the insurance contract varied or was different 
from the original paragraph 3 of the insurance contract, in that 
it did not contain the sentence relating to automatic termination 
of the contract, the sentence so omitted was waived. Since this 
language was waived, there was no language in the insurance 
contract which would allow the insurance coverage to terminate 
automatically prior to April 1, 1988 (the maturity date of the 
original note). An insurance policy which contains no terms by 
which the policy may expire, cannot, as in a matter of law (as 
well as a matter of common sense), expire by its own terms. 
Where no terms describing the means of expiration existed in the 
policy, expiration simply could not occur prior to maturity of 
the policy on April 1, 1988, or prior to cancellation pursuant to 
notice. 
Requirements for cancellation are codified by statute in 
Utah. See, U.C.A. Section 31A-21-303(2)(b) and (3); U.C.A. 
Section 70C-6-304. Such code sections required Defendant to give 
at least ten days notice, and as many as thirty days notice, 
prior to cancellation. Id. Defendant, by its own admission, 
failed to comply with the policy's terms and/or the statutory 
requirements for the cancellation of the insurance policy (R.119, 
125). There being no contract provision dealing with termination 
of insurance, and because there was no cancellation prior to the 
fire on March 8, 1988, the policy was still in full force and 
effect at the time the Plaintiff's property was destroyed. 
In addition, Utah statutory law precludes arbitrary or 
unannounced termination of insurance, unless a class of 
insurance has been exempted from protection from unannounced 
termination. See, U.C.A. Section 31A-21-303(1)(c). There is no 
proof in the record that the subject insurance policy falls under 
such an exempted class of insurance. Such statute is in 
accordance with the general judicial policy stating that 
provisions for notice of cancellation of insurance policies are 
intended to prevent cancellation of a policy without allowing the 
insured ample time to obtain other insurance. See, Taxter v. 
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 721 P.2d 972, 974 (Wash. App. 1986); 
Crowley v. Lafevette Life Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 858 (Idaho 
1984). Any termination of the Plaintiff's insurance coverage in 
this case would have been a secret termination, which is not 
allowed by either law or policy in Utah. Such a termination 
should not be allowed to take place pursuant to "boilerplate" 
language in an insurance policy drafted unilaterally by the 
insurance company, or for any other reason. Therefore, the 
appellate court should reverse the trial courts decision and 
award summary judgment to the Plaintiff on its Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as the reasons set 
forth in the Plaintiff's original Appellant Brief, the lower 
court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in not granting Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff/Appellant, therefore, requests this Court of 
Appeals to reverse the lower court's Order of Summary Judgment 
and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice, and to grant summary 
judgment to Plaintiff on its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In addition, Appellant asks for fees and costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this // day of April, 1990. 
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